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THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE FAILURE OF THE
COMMUNITY PROPERTY REFORM TO ACHIEVE
MANAGEMENT EQUALITY

ELIZABETH

R. CARTER*

INTRODUCTION

Money is power. The fight for gender equality is, at its heart, a fight for both.
In recent history, women have made significant strides in narrowing the moneygender gap, but we have been less successful in closing the gender-power gap.'
Scholars widely assumed that as women entered the workforce they would
achieve economic parity with men.2 Indeed, women have made undeniable
progress in closing the income and earnings gap between the sexes. 3 What
happens outside the home, however, does not tell the full story. "[E]aming
money is not the same thing as controlling income. ' 4 A woman's, particularly a
married woman's, ability to earn money does not necessarily correlate to her
power to achieve equality at home or in society. 5 "Regardless of how money is
earned outside the home, only a minority of households manage money within the
home in ways that equitably benefit both women and men,"6 yet equal
participation in financial decisions is desirable for a variety of reasons. Not only
is equal participation in financial decisions more consistent with modern views
of marriage as an egalitarian partnership, it appears to actually promote
relationship stability Equal participation also benefits society as whole by
enabling women to participate fully in society and polity, thereby closing the
gender-power gap.'
Sociologists use the term "allocative system" to describe what happens to

* Judge Anthony J. Graphia & Jo Ann Graphia Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State
University. B.A., University of Memphis; J.D., Tulane University; LL.M. in Taxation, University
of Alabama.
1. See Catherine T. Kenney, The Power of the Purse: Allocative Systems andInequality in
Couple Households, 20 GENDER & Soc'Y 354, 359-62 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Andr~e Peart Laney, Legal and Policy Issues Impacting Pay Equity, N.J. LAW., Feb.

2014, at 35.
4. Kenney, supra note 1, at 354.

5. Id. at 357.
6. Jeffrey Dew et al., Examining the RelationshipBetween FinancialIssues and Divorce,

61 FAM. RELATIONS 615, 617 (2012).
7. Cybele Weisser, 7 Ways to Stop FightingAbout Money and Grow Richer, Together,

MoNEY (June 1,2014), http://time.com/money/2791658/couples-marriage-money-survey-femalebreadwinners/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZU3U-ASZN (describing how couples who share
financial decisions are happier).
8. Mary Beth Franklin, Women ClosingFinancialLiteracyGenderGap, INVESTMENTNEWS

(June 23, 2014), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140623/BLOG05/140629978/womenclosing-financial-literacy-gender-gap, archivedat http://perma.cc/FJX9-ZGY5.
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money once it enters the home.9 Research suggests that the allocative system a
couple employs is often a reflective of socio-economic demographics.' Those
allocative systems that are most common in the United States continue to work
to the disadvantage of women." The law in most common law states expressly
perpetuates this problem. 2 Since the passage of the Married Women's Property
Acts in the 1800s, 3 American common law jurisdictions have taken a hands-off
approach to how spouses manage money once it is brought into the home.
Legally, each spouse can manage the property titled in his or her name, and the
spouses are free to title property in their names jointly.' 4 The practical and
predictable consequence of this hands-off approach is that existing gender
economic inequities are simply brought home.
The unequal participation in financial decisions by spouses in the American
community property states is, however, more surprising. Beginning in the late
1960s, the community property states abandoned gender-based management rules
in favor of regimes that ostensibly granted women rights comparable to their
husbands, thus furthering the community property view of marriage as an equal
economic partnership between the spouses.'5 With the exception of Texas, every
community property jurisdiction adopted a legal regime that facially granted the
spouses equal management rights over their community property.' 6 Why, then,
is the law not reflected in the allocative systems spouses actually utilize in
practice?
Perhaps it is. This Article argues that equal management does not exist in
any important sense, and that the true goal of the equal management laws was
never equality. Community property laws can no longer be honestly described
as "a vehicle to ensure the devotion of the couple's resources to this unique
partnership's purpose: the well-being and future prosperity of the family the
couple creates" unless the wife and children are not considered a part of that
family.' 7 Today, wives in community property states have no better rights than
wives in separate property states. In some cases, their economic position may

9. See Kenney, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Id.
13. Married Women 's PropertyLaws, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://memory.loc.gov/
ammem/awhhtmlawlaw3/propertylaw.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014), archivedat http://perma.
cc/H4RC-PKA9.

14. Thomas M. Featherston, Jr., His, Her or Their Property: A Primeron MaritalProperty
Law in the Community Property States, AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION (July 14, 2014),
http://www.baylor.edu/law/faculty/doc.php/205011.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/W8EA-TBW6.
15. JO FREEMAN, WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 365-404 (1995).
16. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2364 (2014). "Each spouse acting alone may manage,
control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise provided by law."
17. See Cynthia A. Samuel & Katherine S. Spaht, Fixing What's Broke: Amending ERISA
to Allow Community Property to Apply Upon the Death of a Participant'sSpouse, 35 FAM. L. Q.
425, 432 (2001).
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even be worse.
Part I describes the various allocative systems identified by sociologists and
provides empirical support for the importance of egalitarian management. Part
II describes the historical development of the two legally sanctioned management
regimes in the United States: the separate property regime and the community
property regime. Part II also examines how spouses actually managed their
money in the pre-1970s era. Part III argues that equality was not achieved in fact
or in law. First, Part III relies on quantitative and qualitative research to
demonstrate that equality was not achieved in fact. Then, Part III examines the
history of the reform era and argues that equality was not the primary goal of the
legal reforms. Part IV elaborates on this thesis and examines how the laws in
effect today perpetuate inequality.
I. SPOUSAL MONEY MANAGEMENT: ALLOCATIVE SYSTEMS
The manner in which spouses actually manage their assets has always been
more nuanced than the law suggests. To better describe what happens to money
once it enters the home, sociologists have identified six distinct "allocative
systems."' 8 These allocative systems classify spousal money control and
management along a continuum by reference to two factors.19 The first basis of
classification looks at whether and to what extent the spouses combine their
money into a common pot or account.2 0 Spouses may entirely combine their
money into a common pot, they may keep their money entirely separate, or they
may combine only a portion of their money. 2' The second basis of classification
considers which spouse has control over the money.2 One spouse may control
all of the money or the spouses may jointly manage the money.23 At the spousal
level, the manner in which spouses manage their money is an "indicator of the
level of equality in a relationship. 24 Spouses who share responsibility for
managing money tend to exhibit greater equality in their relationships. 25 In
contrast, couples that vest management authority in one spouse alone are
particularly unequal in their relationships. 6 As a matter of public policy, equality
should be our preference, and it should be reinforced by the law.
A. Allocative Systems in General

The six allocative systems identified by sociologists are:

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

(1) separate

Kenney, supra note 1, at 359-62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.

24. Carrie Yodanis & Sean Lauer, Managing Money in Marriage: Multilevel and Cross-

NationalEffects of the BreadwinnerRole, 69 J.MARRIAGE & FAM. 1307,1307 (2007).
25. Id. at 1309.
26. Id.
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money/women's control; (2) separate money/men's control; (3) separate
money/equal control; (4) pooled money/women's control; (5) pooled
money/men's control; and (6) pooled money/equal control. 27 A brief description
of each follows.
1. Separate Money/Women's Control.-Spouses utilizing the separate
money/women's control allocative system typically combine all of the wife's
income, if any, with a portion of the husband's income into a single pot or
account. 28 The wife has control over that combined fund and uses it for
household expenditures. 29 The husband, however, retains a portion of his
earnings for his own discretionary spending." "The implication of women's
control, in conjunction with segregated money, is that most of the money for
household spending is managed by the woman but that she does not have access
to all of the man's earnings."'" At first blush, the separate money/women's
control allocative system appears to give the wife substantial control over the
couple's finances and, in turn, control in the relationship. Research, however,
suggests the exact opposite to be the case.32 Today, the separate money/women's
control allocative system is most common in low-income households, "where
there is insufficient money to meet the bills
and the task is likely to be a chore or
33
a burden rather than a source of power.,
2. Separate Money/Men's Control.-Under the separate money/men's
control allocative system the husband retains control over his own earnings and
is responsible for paying the household expenses. 34 The wife typically has little
or no income of her own and has no meaningful access to her husband's income.35
The husband may provide the wife with a "housekeeping allowance" so that she
may buy groceries and perform other household errands.36 Research indicates
that the separate money/men's control allocative system is particularly unequal
and unfavorable to women with respect to women's access to personal spending
money.37
3. Separate Money/Equal Control.-The separate money/equal control
allocative system is sometimes referred to as a "partial pooling" system.38 Under
this allocative system, money is segregated and each spouse controls his or her

27. Id.
28. See Kenney, supra note 1, at 360.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Carolyn Volger et al., Intimate Relationships and Changing Patterns of Money
Management at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century, 57 BRiT. J. Soc. 455,461 (2006).
34. Kenney, supra note 1, at 360.
35. See id.
36. Id
37. Id.
38. Id.
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funds independently.39 "[N]either partner has full access to the other's money,
and household expenses are taken care of either by having each individual pay
certain bills or by both pooling some portion of income for household expenses
The separate
while each keeps his or her remaining income separate." '
money/equal control allocative system is more common when both spouses are
employed full-time and have higher income levels.4
4. PooledMoney/Women's Control.-The pooled money/women's control
allocative system is one in which the spouses combine all of their money into a
common pot that is controlled by the wife.42 Just like the separate
money/women's control allocative system, the pooled money/women's control
allocative system is less advantageous to women than its name suggests. The
pooled money/women's control allocative system is associated with lowerincome households where controlling money is a chore rather than a source of
power or independence.43
5. Pooled Money/Men's Control.-The pooled money/men's control
allocative system is the opposite of the pooled money/women's control allocative
system. Under this system all money is combined into a single account or pot
that is controlled by the husband." Research suggests this system is associated
with higher income levels where only the man is employed.45
6. Pooled Money/Equal Control.-The final allocative system, pooled
money/equal control, is one in which the spouses combine all of their funds into
46
a joint account or pool and then share management responsibility equally.
B. The Best Approach: PooledMoney/Equal Control
Research suggests that a couple's choice of allocative system impacts the
quality and stability of their relationship, the wellbeing of their children, and
women's position in the economy and society as a whole.47 The bulk of the
research demonstrates that shared management and access to pooled financial
assets by both spouses is a desirable outcome. In contrast, "if one person
manages financial assets,48 whether it is the woman or the man, women are in a
disadvantaged position.
1. Significance of Equality Within the Relationship.-Sharedpower is a
critical factor in intimate relationships.4 9 Research shows that "individuals in

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Yodanis & Lauer, supra note 24, at 1308.
See, e.g., Hara Estroff Marano, Love and Power, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 24, 2014),
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intimate relationships are concerned about equity, that the presence or absence of
equity has significant effects on individuals' satisfaction, and that equitable
relationships are more stable than inequitable relationships." 50 Put simply, shared
power is often the key to successful intimate relationships. 51 Yet, equality is
elusive for many couples. 52 "The social context both supports and inhibits the
development of marital equality."5 3 Changing societal views of gender roles
supports a move towards equality and couples tend to "enter into relationships
with egalitarian ideals. 54 However, "the power differential between men and
women in the larger social context. . . spills into marriages."" Power disparities
in financial decisions are particularly problematic.56 If a couple, like many
couples, chooses an inequitable allocative system then their relationship faces an
uphill battle.57 Disagreements about money are more likely to be high-conflict
in nature than other types of disagreements, and, consequently, are strong
predictors of divorce.58 In addition to the problems directly linked to a couples'
financial power disparity, a couple's choice of allocative system is often
associated with other measures of inequality in the relationship.59 Inequitable
allocative systems are ubiquitous in abusive relationships.6"
2. SignificanceofEquality to ChildrenandFamily Unit.-Research suggests
that children's and women's wellbeing are positively impacted by the wife's
equal access to all of a couple's money.6 1 Jan Paul's research from the United
Kingdom demonstrates that spending is a gendered activity.62 Women are more
likely than men to spend money on resources that will benefit the family and
children-a pattern confirmed in other studies 6 3-while men spend more money

https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/201312/love-and-power, archived at http://perma.cc/
28K5-ZQP8; Peter Kollock et al., The Judgment of Equity in Intimate Relationships, 57 Soc.
PSYCHOL.Q., 340,340-41 (1994).
50. Kollock et al., supra note 49, at 340-41.
51. See Marano, supra note 49.
52. Carmen Knudson-Martin & Ann Rankin Mahoney, Language and Processes in the
Construction of Equality in New Marriages,47 FAM. RELATIONS 81, 82 (1998).

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Dew, supra note 6.

57. Id.
58. Id.
at 624.
59. Vogler, supra note 33, at 461.
60. See Yodanis & Laurer, supra note 24, at 1307.
61. See, e.g., Nancy Burns et al., The Public Consequences of PrivateInequality: Family
Life and Citizen Participation,91 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 373, 377 (1997); C. Nyman, GenderEquality
in "The Most Equal Country in the World"? Money and Marriagein Sweden, 47 Soc. REv. 767

(1999).
62. Jan Pahl, The Genderingof Spending Within Households, RADICAL
(2000).

63. See Bums et al., supra note 61.

STATS. 75,

38-48

2015]

THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY

on pleasure and discretionary items.' The numbers are striking. In Pahl's study,
women were responsible for nearly all expenditures on women's and children's
clothing: 90% and 85%, respectively.65 Women accounted for 80% of food
expenditures, 78% of child-care and school related expenditures, and 59% of
medical and dental expenditures.66 Men, in contrast, accounted for 73% of
alcohol expenditures, 69% of motor vehicle expenditures, 64% of vacation
67
expenditures, and 65% of gambling expenditures. Catherine Kenney's research
68 Her
in the United States on children's food insecurity echoes these findings.
research shows a relationship between a couple's choice of allocative system and
food insecurity. 69 The relationship between food security and poverty is not
entirely obvious. "About 36% of U.S. households below the poverty line
experience food insecurity, but even above 185% of the poverty line, 7% of U.S.
households with children are food insecure, suggesting that parents' capabilities,
70
preferences, and circumstances may also play a role." The choice of allocative
system a couple uses is correlated with the likelihood their children will
experience food insecurity.7 1 Generally, the more power the father has over the
72
food insecurity.
family's income the more likely the children will experience
"The odds of child food insecurity are over 2.5 times higher when the father
73
Interestingly, spousal
controls pooled income than when the mother does."
equality did not improve things. "The -odds of food insecurity are almost 2.3
times higher when both parents 'equally' control pooled income than when the
mother alone does. 74 This phenomenon is likely a result of "gender inequalities
making [that] remain under the surface of these nominally
in control of decision
75
equal accounts.,
3. Significance of Equality to Society.-A couple's allocative system may
seem like a purely private matter. The truth, however, is that inequitable
allocative systems harm society as whole. Cross-national research has shown a
direct correlation between income inequality at the national level and the
76
prevalence of unequal spousal allocative systems. Some sociologists theorize

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Pahl, supra note 62.
67. Id.
68. Catherine T. Kenney, Father Doesn't Know Best? Parents' Control of Money and
Children'sFood Insecurity, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 654 (2008).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 657 (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 663.
72. See id. at 666-67 ("Children are more likely to be food insecure when their father controls
either pooled or separate income than when their mother controls pooled income.").
73. Id. at 663.
74. Id.
75. Id.at 667.
76. See Sean R. Lauer & Carrie Yodanis, Economic Inequality In and Outsideof Marriage:
IndividualResources and institutionalContext, 23 EuR. Soc. REv. 573, 579 (2007).

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:853

that spouses may adopt allocative systems in light of the societies in which they
reside.77 "For example, couples in context where economic inequality is
pervasive and accepted may be more likely to draw on these institutionalized
rules and practices and adopt them within their own relationships." 7" The reverse
of this theory is probably true as well. "[P]atriarchal domestic relationships have
consequences for women's ability to participate fully as citizens. 79
Men are more politically active than women from a financial standpointmaking more and larger contributions to political causes."0 A 1997 study found
an interesting relationship between this phenomenon and domestic life."'
Husbands who reported greater authority at home-particularly with respect to
financial decisions-were more likely to be active in politics.82 A husband's
power over financial decisions at home appeared to increase his political activity
"beyond what would be expected on the basis of [his] other characteristics." 3
II. LEGAL REGULATION OF ALLOCATIVE SYSTEMS

A couple's ability to select a particular allocative system is impacted, to some
extent, by the laws regulating the management of property. Two marital property
regimes exist in the United States: the separate property system and the
community property system. 84 The separate property system, founded in common
law, employs a title theory to the ownership of marital property.85 During
marriage, the spouse who holds the title to an asset has the ownership of that asset
and the authority to manage it. 86 The community property system, in contrast, is
founded in civil law and provides for an automatic sharing of all marital property
by the spouses.87 Each spouse has an equal present and vested ownership interest
in each item of marital property. For nearly a century, scholars widely regarded
American community property laws as progressive and beneficial to

77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 575.
Id. at 579.
Bums et al., supra note 61, at 373.
Id. at 374; see also Sarah Bryner & Doug Weber, Sex, Money & Politics, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Sept. 26, 2013), available at http:// http://www.opensecrets.org/news/
reports/gender.php, archivedat http://perma.cc/VX3Z-AZLS.
81. Bums et al., supra note 61, at 373.
82. Id. at 382.
83. Id. at 384.
84. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Marital Propertyand the Conflict of Laws: A Tale of Two
Countries,81 COLUM. L. REv. 1061, 1067 (1981).
85. See Laura W. Morgan & Edward S. Snyder, When Title Matters: Transmutationandthe
Joint Title Gift Presumption, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 335, 336-38 (2003) (discussing the
title system).
86. Id.
87. Caroline Bermeo Newcombe, The Originand Civil Law Foundationof the Community
PropertySystem, Why CaliforniaAdopted it, and Why Community PropertyPrinciplesBenefit
Women, 11 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1,7(2011).
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women-8 8 -calling these laws the "crowning point of women's legal
emancipation." 9 Wives in community property jurisdictions enjoyed-at least
in theory-an elevated status compared to their counterparts in common law
states because they possessed a current property interest in their husbands'
earnings. 90 Historically, both systems, in their application, reinforced a
preference for male-dominated allocative systems and served to perpetuate the
money-power gap faced by women.
A. SeparateProperty System
The separate property system, based in common law, historically adopted the
"merger" theory of marriage. 91 Under this view, marriage resulted in the legal
92
merger of the husband and wife into a single individual under the law. This
suspension or merger of the wife's separate legal identity--called coverture-had
a number of legal effects. 93 Married women could not sue or be sued, enter into
94
or be held liable for contracts, incur debts, or manage property. While a woman
was under coverture she lost the authority to manage even the property she
95 These
brought into the marriage and her own earnings during marriage.
96
management rights, rather, belonged to the husband.
Beginning in the 1800s the separate property jurisdictions enacted a series of
laws-the Married Women's Property Acts-which sought to remove the legal
disabilities of married women.97 These acts remain the only significant change
in the law in separate property states with respect to the management of marital
property during marriage.9" The Married Women's Property Acts were "designed
to abolish the common law 'unity' of husband and wife, and thereby to secure to
a married woman a separate legal identity from her husband with corresponding
99
substantive and procedural rights."

Since the enactment of the Married

Women's Property Acts, management of property by spouses in separate property

88. See M.R. Kirkwood, HistoricalBackground and Objectives of the Law of Community
Property in the PacificCoast States, 11 WASH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1936).
89. Alice L. Bendheim, Comment, Community Property: Male Managementand Women's
Rights, 1972 LAW& SOC. ORDER 163, 163.
90. See generally Newcombe, supra note 87, at 1.
91. Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859, 861 (Pa. 1981).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Bernie D. Jones, Revisitingthe MarriedWomen 'sPropertyActs: RecapturingProtection
in the Face of Equality, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L 91, 99 (2013).

96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Bloomfield v. Brown, 25 A. 2d 354, 369 (R.I. 1942) ("It maybe said generally
that the effect of the married women's act is to raise up the wife, in the eyes of the law, to the same
position as that of the husband.").
98. See generally Jones, supra note 95.
99. Hack, 433 A.2d at 861.
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jurisdictions is determined by reference to the title to the property. l00 A spouse
who takes property in his or her own name individually may freely manage that
property without the involvement of the other spouse. 'O' If the spouses elect to
take title to property as joint tenants, then joinder or concurrence of the other
spouse may be required. 102 Separate property jurisdictions do not, however,
generally require that spouses jointly own marital property.'03 Rather, spouses
must take some affirmative step to cause title to property to be in both of their
names." The fact that separate property states do not contemplate the automatic
concurrent ownership of property during marriage is, probably, the single most
distinguishing feature of the two systems today.
B. Community PropertySystem
The American community property jurisdictions'" 5-with the exception of
Wisconsin °6 -generally trace their lineage to their Spanish, and to a more limited
extent, French roots.1"7 The states adhered to a ganancial system of community
property, which draws a distinction between so-called community assets and
separate assets based on the timing and source of their acquisition. 8 Generally,
assets acquired before marriage, or by gift or inheritance, remained a spouse's
separate property.0 9 Assets acquired during marriage as a result of a spouse's
labor or industry-most notably earnings from employment-were generally
community property."0 Community assets were owned equally by both

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. J. Thomas Oldham, Management of the Community Estate Duringan Intact Marriage,
56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99-170 (Spring 1993), available at http://scholarship.law.
duke.edu/lcp/vo156/iss2/4, archivedat http://perma.ccVCM8-WDB8.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington.
Howard S. Erlanger & June M. Weisberger, From Common Law Propertyto CommunityProperty:
Wisconsin's MaritalPropertyAct Four Years Later, 1990 WiS. L. REV. 769, 769 n.2.
106. Wisconsin became a community property state on January 1, 1986. Because Wisconsin
was not a part of the managerial reform movement it is largely omitted from this Article. See
generally id.
107. See, e.g., Harriet S. Daggett, The Modern Problem of the Nature of the Wife's Interest
in Community Property-A Comparative Study, 19 CAL. L. REV. 567, 569-70 (1931).
108. See William A. Reppy, Jr., Major Events in the Evolution of American Community
PropertyLaw and Their Import to EquitableDistributionStates, 23 FAM. L.Q. 163, 166 (1989).
109. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2173 (1928); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 162-64 (West 1892);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 4051-52 (West 190 1); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2334 (1880); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 510 (1900).
110. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §2172 (1928); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 162-64 (West 1892);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2053 (West 1901); NEV. REV. STAT. § 511 (1900).
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spouses."l' These basic similarities in the classification of assets continue today.
The community property states agreed on the superiority of male
management of the community assets." 2 To that end, the husband was legally the3
sole manager of the community property in every community property state.1
A number of states went further and granted the husband management power over
his wife's separate property as well--effectively depriving married women of any
opportunity to manage or control property." 4 From the wife's point of view, the
community property states offered few advantages over the separate property
states during an ongoing marriage. The most meaningful advantage was not
obtained unless a wife divorced or outlived her husband." 5 In the community
property states wives were better off in these events because they would be
entitled to one-half of the former community property whereas wives in common
law states usually had no property rights. "6
In the early years, the husband's power over the community property was
incredibly broad. Two articles from the California Civil Code of 1892 are typical
and illustrate this point:
§ 156. The husband is the head of the family. He may choose any
reasonable place or mode of living, and the wife must conform thereto.
§ 172. The husband has the management and control of the community
property, with the absolute power of disposition (other than testamentary)
as he has of his separate estate.' 17
As a tradeoff for his vast management rights, however, the husband was held
to a type of fiduciary standard in managing the community property. "' California

111. See § 2172; § 162-64; § 2053; § 511.
112. See Daggett, supra note 107, at 577-78 (explaining the husband had only one restriction
on the disposition of community property).
113. Erlanger & Weisberger, supra note 105, at 773.
114. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2054 (West 1887) ("The husband has the management and
control of the separate property of the wife .. "); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2350, 2384, 2390
(1880) (granting the wife limited management rights over her paraphernal property but not property
considered part of her dowry); TEx. Crv. REV. STAT. art. 4621 (West 1913) ("Allproperty, both real
and personal, of the wife, owned of claimed by her before marriage ... shall be the separate
property of the wife; but during the marriage the husband shall have the sole management of all
such property."). But see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 162 (West 1892) ("The wife may, without the
consent of her husband, convey her separate property."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 518 (1911) ("The wife
may, without the consent of her husband, convey, charge, incumber, or otherwise in any matter
dispose of her separate property."); WASH. REV. CODE § 5916 (1910) (allowing a married woman
to "manage, lease, sell, convey, encumber, or devise by will" her separate property).
115. Reppy, supra note 108, at 164.
116. Id.
117. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 156, 172 (West 1892).

118. Vai v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 377 (1961). Accord
Fields v. Michael, 205 P. 2d 402, 405-06 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 193
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equated the husband to a trustee reasoning that "[b]ecause of his management and
control over the community property, the husband occupies the position of trustee
for his wife in respect to her one-half interest in the community assets.""' 9 New
Mexico cases, calling the husband a "sort of fiduciary" held "[t]he husband being
the manager of the community property should exercise the highest good faith
toward the community interests.' 120 Nevada courts likened the spousal
relationship to a business relationship holding that the husband's "position is that
of a trustee for the wife's share analogous to the trustee relationship of a partner
to his partnership or an agent to his principal.' 2' Idaho and Louisiana took
similar approaches.' 22 Texas cases held that "a husband is in a restricted sense the
trustee for his wife, bound to good faith, and derelict in duty if he conceals
knowledge from her necessary to enable her to protect her rights, and that
withholding needed information from her is a breach of duty constituting
fraud.', 123 From a practical standpoint, however, the wife could generally do little
to hold her husband accountable for a breach of his fiduciary duty unless the'
couple had already separated. 124 Only then could the wife seek an accounting
from the husband or seek relief for mismanagement, fraud, or concealment of the
community property. 25
As an extension of the husband's position as a fiduciary, states restricted his
ability to dispose of community property gratuitously to the detriment of his
wife. 126 California statutory law prevented the husband from making gifts of
community property or selling community property for insufficient consideration
without the wife's written consent. 2 7 Louisiana restricted the husband's ability
to make a gift of community real estate unless it was for the benefit of the
couple's children. 28 Texas cases prevented the husband from donating

P. 2d 728, 733 (Cal. 1948).
119. See Vai, 56 Cal. 2d at 377. Accord Fields, 205 P. 2d at 405-06; Jorgensen,P. 2d at 733.
120. Laughlin v. Laughlin, 155 P.2d 1010, 1019 (N.M. 1944). Accord Terry v. Humphries,
203 P. 539, 541 (N.M. 1922).
121. Fox v. Fox, 401 P. 2d 53, 57 (Nev. 1965).
122. See Sande v. Sande, 360 P. 2d 998, 1001 (Idaho 1961); Hodson v. Hodson, 292 So. 2d
831, 836-37 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Pitre v. Pitre, 172 So. 2d 693, 695 (La. 1965).
123. Swearingen v. Swearingen, 193 S.W. 442, 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
124. See Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal. 2d 492, 494-95 (Cal. 1961) ("It is part of a husband's
fiduciary duties to account to the wife for the community property when the spouses are negotiating
a property settlement .... "); Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 558 P. 2d 76, 80 (Idaho 1976) ("[T]he
husband, as the manager of the community under the law at the time the divorce was granted, owed
a fiduciary duty to the wife to account for the community property."); Mazour v. Mazour, 180 P.
2d 103, 104-05 (Nev. 1947).
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 172 (1909).
127. Id.; see, e.g., Novo v. Hotel Del Rio, 295 P. 2d 576 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (holding
that transfer of community funds to satisfy gambling debt without wife's written concurrence fell
within the scope of the statute).
128. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2404 (1880).

2015]

THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY

community property in fraud of the wife's rights. 129 Washington case law held
that the "husband is given management and control of community personal
property for the purpose of facilitating the business of the community."13' In
practice, Washington courts used this standard to invalidate a variety of
irresponsible gratuitous transfers of community property by the husband.' 3 ' Over
time, the community property states began imposing more meaningful limitations
to the husband's control by granting the wife a certain measure of veto power
over important transactions. 3 2 This typically meant the wife was afforded some
veto power in transactions involving community real estate or immovable
property.133 Community property states also enacted measures aimed at ensuring
the wife had some access to the bare necessities of life. By the early 1900s,
California law provided that "no sale, conveyance or encumbrance of the
furniture, furnishings and fittings of the home, or of the clothing and wearingapparel of the wife or minor children, which is community property, shall be
made without the consent of the wife."' 34 A number of states adopted some form

of the "necessaries doctrine" which allowed the wife to enter contracts in order
to obtain food, clothing, and other basic necessities. 35
'
Eventually, women in some community property states obtained independent
management authority over their earnings.'36 Without specific legislation
allowing a wife to manage her earnings she was not allowed to even deposit or
spend her own paycheck. 137 Texas granted married women management power
over their personal earnings in 1913.138 Unfortunately, subsequent legislative
revisions muddied the issue by omitting the language granting the wife
management of her personal earnings and earnings from her separate

129.
32 S.W.
130.
131.
132.

See, e.g., Watson v. Harris, 130 S.W. 237, 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910); Martin v. Moran,
904, 905-06 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
Hanley v. Most, 115 P. 2d 933, 945 (Wash. 1941).
See id. at 944-45.
ANDREA CARROLL & RiCHARD D. MORENO, 16 LA. Civ. LAW TREATISE: MATRIMONIAL
REGIMES § 5.1 (2014).
133. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:3850 (1913) (requiring the joinder of both spouses
in real estate transactions); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2061 (West 1901) (joinder requirement for
homestead); NEV. REV. STAT. § 515 (1911) (joinder requirement for homestead); Harry M. Cross,
The Community Property Law in Washington, 15 LA. L. REV. 640, 642-43 (1955) (discussing
Washington's joinder requirement for real estate transactions).
134. CAL. Crv. CODE § 172 (West 1909).
135. See, e.g., Durwood Douglas Crawford, Comment, Legal Rights of Married Women in
Texas, 13 Sw. L.J. 84, 84 (1959); Joseph W. McKnight, Texas Community Property Law:
ConservativeAttitudes, Reluctant Change, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 76 (1993).
136. See, e.g., D. F. Bobbitt, ContractualPower of Married Women in Texas, 1 TEX. L. REV.
281,283-84 (1923); Jo Carrillo, The M Word: From PartialCoverture to Skills-Based Fiduciary
Duties in Marriage,22 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 257, 261 (2011).
137. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 135, at 84-85; McKnight, supra note 135, at 76.
138. See Robert Blevins, Jr., Recent Statutory Changes in the Wife's ManagerialPowers, 38
TEx. L. REV. 55, 75 (1959); Bobbitt, supra note 136, at 283-84.
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property-both considered community property in Texas-and several courts
took. the ambiguity as an opportunity to once again divest married women of
13 9 The issue was not laid to rest until 1967.140
control over their earnings.
California granted women management powers over their own earnings in
1951.141 In order to exercise this right, however, the wife had to open and
maintain a separate bank account in her own name. 42 Commingled funds fell
back under the husband's control.' 43 As discussed in Part IV, the explicitly male
preference was not completely abandoned until 1980.
C. Allocative Systems in Practice-Pre-Reform
Unfortunately, researchers only recently began to examine the allocation of
money within households. 44 Information for the pre-reform (pre-1970s) era is
sparse and relies heavily on anecdotal evidence.145 This evidence is, however,
informative. As the law suggested, management of financial matters was
gendered in practice. 46 Among wealthier couples, the separate money/men's
control allocative system was common. 47 Wealthier women might receive some
funds from their husbands in order to manage household expenses, but real
financial power rested with the husband. 148 Upper and middle class women who
wanted some cash of their own had to negotiate with their husbands or employ
other rather creative techniques for obtaining their own money. 149 Anecdotally,
wealthy women were relegated to deceitful and demoralizing tactics in order to
obtain some cash of their own: women asked, begged, and withheld sex from
their husbands in an effort to gain some cash of their own. 50 If they could not get
enough cash from their husbands directly, wealthy wives got even more
creative. 5 ' Some women tried to set aside and save some of the money their

139. See Pottorfv. J.D. Adams Co., 70 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App. 1934); Blevins, supra note 137,
at 75-78.
140. See William 0. Huie, Divided Management of Community Property in Texas, 5 TEx.
TECHL. REv. 623,625 (1974).
141. See Carrillo, supranote 136, at 261; William Q. De Funiak, Community Property,4 ANN.
SURv. CAL. L. 139, 139 (1952); Madeleine Radensky, Note, Giving the "Little Woman" Equal
Management and Control,2 W. ST. U. L. REV. 180, 184-85 (1974).
142. Carrillo, supra note 136, at 261.
143. Id.
144. See Viviana A. Zelizer, The SocialMeaningofMoney: "SpecialMonies, " 95 AM. J. Soc.
342, 342-343 (1989).
145. See id at 352-53.
146. Id. at 354-55.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 355.
149. Id. at 357.
150. Id. at 357-58.
151. Id.
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husbands gave them for housekeeping expenses. 512 Those who could not employ
these creative techniques, however, relied on credit lines established by their
husbands to buy household goods. 53 Paradoxically, wealthy husbands would
gladly pay the large credit bills their wives ran up, but were "unwilling to trust
them with the smallest amount of ready money."' 5 4 "Women bargained with
dressmakers, milliners, and shopkeepers to add extra items to their bills so that,
when the bill was paid, the rich man's wife may get a rake-off and possess a few
dollars.' 55 Some wealthy women sold their old furniture to their servants to raise
cash.'56 Wives even stole money from their husband's pockets while they were
asleep at night.'57
The situation for lower-class women was different, but not better. Workingclass families tended to employ the separate money/women's control allocative
system. 58
' Working husbands and children would hand over their pay--or at least
a portion of their pay-to the wife on payday so that she could pool the money
and apply it towards the family's expenses. 59 The husbands and children
typically received an allowance from their earnings for their own personal
spending money. 60 This allocative system essentially ignored the legally
sanctioned management regime and, to some observers, working-class wives
appeared to have more financial authority and freedom than their wealthier
counterparts. It seems unlikely, however, that lower class men were simply more
comfortable with female financial empowerment than wealthy men. The more
probable explanation for the gender reversal is that managing the finances in a
working-class family was a difficult and laborious task rather than a source of
empowerment. 16' The working-class family needed the bulk of its income to pay
for basic living expenses. 162 Wives were left with the unpleasant task of trying
to make ends meet while husbands, and sometimes children, retained an
allowance for their own discretionary spending. 163 Wives, in contrast, were rarely
left with any discretionary funds of their own. "6Furthermore, the husbands made
the initial determination of just how much of their earnings they were willing to
hand over to their wives each week.'6 5 In many cases, it seems, wives did not

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
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even know how much money their husbands actually made.166
Would legal reforms change the gendered treatment of money?
IIl. THE REFORM MOVEMENT: AN "ERA" OF CHANGE
The continued growth of the married woman's economic power should have
corresponded with a move towards widespread egalitarian allocative systems
within marriage. It did not. As Table 1 demonstrates, the percentage of women,
and married women in particular, that worked outside the home began to increase
dramatically in the middle of the twentieth century, eventually tapering off in the
1990s.167
68
Table 1: Women in the Workforce By Year
Percentage of Working
Percentage of all
Year
Women who were
Women who Worked

Married

1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950

18.9
20.6
25.4
23.7
24.8
25.8
29.0

4.6
5.6
10.7
9.0
11.7
15.6
23.0

1960

34.5

31.7

1970

43.3

40.5

1980

51.5

49.8

1990
2000
2010

57.5
59.9
58.6

58.4
61.1
61.0

The 1960s and 1970s marked an era of significant legal and economic gains
for women. 169 Reforms in divorce laws sought to place women on fair legal and
economic footing with their former husbands and to reflect an egalitarian view
of marriage and gender. 7 ° Nearly every state adopted some form of no-fault
divorce, which allowed spouses to divorce without proving the guilt or innocence

166. Id.
167. See supra Table 1.
168. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL

133-34 (1975), available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/
histstatus/hstatl970_cen_1975_vl.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D6GB-GJPX; U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, 384 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/201 lpubs/12statab/labor.pdf, archivedathttp://perma.cc/3L4D-AN26.
169. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch, Of Work, Family Wealth, and Equality, 17 FAM. L.Q. 99, 99TIMES TO 1970,

100(1983).
170. Id.
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of either spouse in the breakdown of the relationship.17" ' Fault also 7became
2
irrelevant for determining issues of property division and child custody.'1
Changes in property division laws and alimony laws further sought to put
women on equal footing with men. Historically, alimony had only been available
to the wife and often depended on her being found free from fault. 173 The new
alimony laws "emphasize[d] economic need and the desirability of terminating
the former spouses' contact with one another"'74 and favored "short rehabilitive
awards" over lifetime awards.'75 Rather than using alimony as a tool to punish
the guilty spouse, courts began to view alimony as a "method for rehabilitating
76
the party disadvantaged by the divorce," which was typically the woman. 1
The common law states, undoubtedly influenced by the community property
77
states, adopted an equitable distribution approach to dividing assets at divorce.'
At divorce, courts traditionally awarded each spouse the property that was titled
in his or her name-an approach that almost always favored the husband and left
the wife at a distinct economic disadvantage. 78 Equitable distribution, in
contrast, allowed the courts to divide the assets acquired during the marriage
without regard to title. 179 "[T]he trend toward equal division or equitable
distribution of property reflect[ed] the notion that marriage is an egalitarian
partnership with each spouse's efforts benefitting the whole."'8 °
In the decades since these changes to the divorce laws, numerous scholars
and researchers have seriously questioned whether the changes actually improved
the status of women post-divorce.' 8 ' Even if these changes did improve the status
of women post-divorce, they did not address the status of women during
marriage. Giving a woman an equitable share of her husband's assets at divorce
simply did not address the economic inequality that occurs during an intact
marriage. The community property states, however, were forced to address that

171. See, e.g., id.at 99-100; Marjorie E. Komhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership
Model of Marriagein Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413, 1417 (1996).
172. See Henna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspectiveon No-Fault Divorce and
its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1,36-37 (1987).
173. See Nora J. Lauerman, A Step Toward EnhancingEquality, Choice, and Opportunityto
Develop in Marriageandat Divorce, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 498-99 (1987).
174. Bruch, supra note 169, at 100.
175. Kornhauser, supra 171, at 1417.
176. Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754, 758 (N.D. 1981).
177. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's
Equitable DistributionLaw on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 628-3 0 (1991)
178. See, e.g., Brooke Grossman, Note, The Evolution ofEquitableDistributionin New York,
62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 607,609 (2007).
-179. Garrison, supra note 177, at 628.
180. Lauerman, supra note 173, at 501.
181. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 177, at 632-36; Kay, supra note 172, at 1-4; Lynn D.
Wardle, No-FaultDivorceand the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79,79 (1991); Martin
Zelder, The Economic Analysis of the Effect of No-Fault Divorce Law on the Divorce Rate, 16
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 241, 241-243 (1993).
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precise issue.
The potential passage of the Equal Rights Amendment and the evolving
constitutional equal protection jurisprudence during this same time period forced
the American community property jurisdictions to enact changes that did affect
82 Community
the economic relationship of spouses during intact marriages.
property states abandoned their old head and master laws in favor of genderneutral property management systems.1 83 The community property states had the
opportunity to do something truly radical-to cause egalitarian allocative systems
to become the law of the land. Reformers were certainly aware of this possibility
and a few of them tried to use84the law as an instrument of change and to close the
gendered money-power gap.'
By the erid of the reform era all of the community property jurisdictions had
abandoned their gender-based management regime in favor of a gender-neutral
approach. 85 But did they achieve equality? No.
A wife in an intact marriage in a community property state is in no better
position today than is a wife in a common law state. As in the past, the real
"benefits" of community property will only be realized if the wife divorces her
husband or outlives him-and reforms in common law states have since lessened
the disparities between the systems in the death and divorce context.
A. Equality Was Not Achieved Quantitative& QualitativeResearch
Equality was not achieved. Money management remains a highly gendered
86
activity--one that typically operates to the disadvantage of the wife. Although
no state-specific studies exist, a number of studies shed light on how married
couples actually manage their finances. 8 7 The existing research demonstrates
that the pooled money/equal control allocative system-the system widely
regarded as the most desirable system-is not the approach utilized by most
couples.' 88
Several studies demonstrate that married American couples prefer to pool
their income in some manner.' 89 One study, relying on data from the initial wave
of the 1984 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation ("SIPP")
conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, examined how couples managed
their money by looking at their bank accounts.' 90 Only 18% of couples reported

182. See, e.g., Morgan A. Jones, History of the Family Code, 5 TEX.TECHL. REv. 267, 267
(1973).
183. See Lauerman, supra note 173, at 501.
184. See Bruch, supra note 169, at 99-101.
185. See Wardle, supra note 181, at 79.
186. See, e.g., Zelizer, supra note 144, at 368-70.
187. See Judith Treas, Money in the Bank: TransactionCosts andtheEconomic Organization
of Marriage,58 AM. Soc. REV. 723, 727 (1993).
188. See, e.g., id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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using exclusively separate bank accounts-a possible indicator that these couples
did not pool their income. 9 ' Approximately 18% of couples maintained both
joint and separate bank accounts. 9 2 The remaining approximately 64% of
respondents maintained only joint bank accounts."' On the whole, most
respondents (82%) pooled their income in some fashion, but the study did not
reveal whether that pooling also resulted in equal control. 194 Another study,
relying on data from the 1994 Family and Changing Gender Roles II module of
the International Social Survey Program ("ISSP"), had similar findings using a
different data set. 95 This study found that approximately 83% of American
married couples pooled their income together, while approximately 17% of
married couples kept their money separate. 196 Again, the study did not examine
how money was managed within the pooled system. 197 More recent surveys
indicate that couples increasingly maintain a mixture of joint and separate bank
accounts.'9 8 A 2014 survey conducted by TD Bank found that 42% of couples
that maintain joint bank accounts also maintain separate accounts. 199
Several studies suggest that truly equal management of pooled income is not
common. 21 Qualitative studies have found that "among male breadwinnerfemale homemaker couples using joint accounts, inequalities remain in access to
money because noneaming women feel uncomfortable spending on themselves
using money they did not earn or because breadwinning men retain primary
decision-making power over money that is nominally pooled. ' , 2 1' A 1997 study
based on data collected by telephone interviews found that, although wives are
primarily responsible for shopping and paying the bills, "financial decision
making is a domain in which husbands report, on average, that they exercise
greater control than is reported by wives., 212 Nearly three-fourths of the
husbands surveyed reported that they were responsible for making major financial
decisions.20 3 Yet, the same survey showed a widespread belief in gender equality

191. Id. at 729.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.at 729.
195. Kristen R. Heimdal & Sharon K. Houseknecht, CohabitingandMarriedCouples 'Income
Organization: Approaches in Sweden and the UnitedStates, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 525, 525-32
(2003).
196. Id. at 532.
197. Id.
198. Press Release, TD Bank, TD Bank Survey Finds Many Couples Maintain Separate Bank
Accounts (March 24, 2014), available at https://mediaroom.tdbank.com/2014-03-24-TD-BankSurvey-Finds-Many-Couples-Maintain-Separate-Bank-Accounts, archived at http://perma.cc/
AEA7-AV6A.
199. Id.
200. Kenney, supra note 1, at 357.
201. Id.
202. Bums, supra note 61, at 378.
203. Id. at 380.
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and shared decision-making. 2" In the view of the study's authors, "when it
comes to gender equality in the division of household chores and responsibilities,
2 5
beliefs appear to have outrun practice.""
Catherine Kenney's 2006 study, which relied on data gathered in 2002 and
2003 as part of Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing national birth cohort study
06
of parents and their children, is the most on point American study to date.1
Although the study is somewhat limited in its sample pool, 2 7 the results are
revealing. The study divided married couples into two categories: (1) those
where the mother is married to the baby's father; and (2) those where the mother
is married to a new partner. The results, which are summarized on Table 2,
reveal that only a minority of women reported using the pooled money/equal
control system. 208 Most couples utilized some form of pooling-83% of mothers
married to the baby's father and 80% of mothers married to a new partner
reported some type of pooling arrangement. 20 9 These numbers are consistent with
the findings from earlier studies. Kenney's study, however, went further and
examined the types of pooling arrangements used. Taken as a whole, Kenney's
study suggests that 65-71% of married couples with young children utilize an
allocative system that tends to put the wife at a financial disadvantage.2 10
Table 2: Distribution of Allocative Systems Among Married Women with
Children from FFCW Data
Variable

Mother
Married
to Baby's
Father
Mother
Married
to New
Partner

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Separate,
Woman
Control

Percentage
Separate,
Man
Control

Using Allocative
Separate, Equal
Control (Partial
Pooling)

System
Pooled,
Woman
Control

Pooled,
Man
Control

Pooled,
Equal
Control

10%

7%

11%

24%

13%

35%

16%

4%

11%

24%

16%

29%

Id.
Id.
Kenney, supra note 1.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 368.
Id.
See supra Table 2.

2015]

THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY

B. Equality Was Not a Goal: Legal & HistoricalAnalysis
No state gave serious consideration to true egalitarianism. Likely the biggest
concern for many legislators was enacting laws that were gender neutral on their
face, while also maintaining the breadwinner's dominance in money
management. Even those reformers who saw equality and egalitarianism as a
laudable goal failed to view the law as a meaningful tool for implementing
change."' Commentators repeatedly-and erroneously-contended that women
already participated in family finances in such a manner as to have achieved
power parity with men.1 Reformers simply assumed that because women's
place in the workforce and society had undergone some change that it had
changed at home as well. 1 3 But this was not true then and is not true now.
Women's increased market participation had not resulted in egalitarian marital
relationships during the reform era, nor has it resulted in widespread
egalitarianism some forty years later.
1. Texas-The Dual Management/Two Fund Approach.-Texas, the first
state to change its laws, never even attempted to enact legislation supporting an
egalitarian view of the marriage relationship. Texas adopted a separate but equal
management approach in an effort to maintain the status quo while throwing a
bone to women advocating for change. In adopting an approach dubbed "dual
management," or "the two fund approach," Texas gave women freedom from
their husbands-not equality. No other community property jurisdiction overtly
followed the Texas approach, but they are no less problematic.
The organized advocacy of Texas women led to reform years before other
states even considered the issue.21 4 By the mid-1950s, women's groups in
Texas-most notably the Texas Federation of Business and Professional
21 5
Women's Club ("BPW")-sought to eliminate sex discrimination in the law.

211. See, e.g., Arnold D. Kahn & Paul N. Frimmer, Management, Probate and Estate
Planning Under California'sNew Community Property Laws, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 516, 518 (1974)
("[I]t is difficult to imagine that the new law will have a significant effect on most households.
Family finances are such a personal matter that 'management and control' is more a function of the
relationship of the parties ... than it is of legislative fiat.").
212. See, e.g., Janet Mary Riley, Women's Rights in the LouisianaMatrimonialRegime, 50

TuL. L. REV. 557, 561 (1976).
213. See Radensky, supra note 141; Cynthia Shoss Wall, Management of the Louisiana
Community PropertySystem: The Needfor Reform, 48 TUL. L. REV. 591,592 (1974).
214. See, e.g., Ida M. Greenblatt, Texas'Dynamic Battle for Equal Legal Rightsfor Women,
50 WOMEN L. J. 25 (1964) ("Early this year the Equal Legal Rights for Women's group marched
in great number to Austin, Texas, to meet the Texas legislatures face to face, in their fight for equal
rights. The battle was organized, planned, and carefully documented."); Jones, supra note 182, at
267 ("The Bar, however, gradually was forced to take action because of the increasing pressures
which women's groups were bringing to bear on lawmakers for passage of the equal rights
amendment.").
215. Joseph W. McKnight, Texas Community PropertyLaw--Its CourseofDevelopment and
Reform, 8 CAL. W. L. REV. 117, 128 (1971) [hereinafter McKnight, Texas Community Property
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"With 8,400 members and 185 clubs state-wide, the [BPW] had the potential for
being a powerful legislative lobbying group and could be used to educate voters
and legislators about pending bills., 216 In 1957 the BPW asked an attorney,
Hermine D. Tobolowsky, to work on a bill that would, among other rights, grant
married women control over their own separate property.217 At the legislature,
Ms. Tobolowsky was met with outright hostility. 2 8 When Ms. Tobolowsky
testified before a senate committee hearing in favor of the bill, the senators were
not encouraging. One senator reportedly informed Ms. Tobolowsky that,
"[w]omen are too stupid to handle property. '21 9 This sentiment was a fairly
common one. A 1964 poll conducted by the Texas Bar Journal found that
members of the bar opposed equal rights for women by a vote of two-to-one.2 °
Texas women faced an uphill battle gain equal, legal recognition and,
understandably, egalitarianism within marriage-a loftier and more progressive
goal--does not appear to have formed a major part of their platform.
Texas women had pressured the legislature to amend the state constitution in
order to prohibit gender discrimination for many years. 221 By the mid- 1960s,
legislators feared that they would not be reelected if they continued to oppose the
amendment.222 In an effort to avoid a constitutional amendment prohibiting
gender discrimination generally, the legislature and the state bar association
worked on a proposal to reform the state's community property laws in order to
appease the state's women. 22' The reforms were presented as the "answer [to] the
demands for equality of both partners to the marital union" whose object was "to
recognize that both spouses stand before the law in complete parity., 224 Despite
these claims, equality and parity were hardly present during the reform process
nor in the resulting laws. The committee tasked with drafting the new laws
consisted of four men and one woman. 225 The committee was aided by a group
of academic advisors consisting of six men and one woman.226 Not surprisingly,
the reform-which was passed into law in 1967--did not provide for a true

Law]; McKnight, supra note 135, at 86.
216. Tai Kreidler, Hermine Tobolowsky: Mother ofTexas's EqualLegal RightsAmendment,
in THE HUMAN TRADITION INTEXAS, 209, 213 (1984).
217. Id.
218. Kimberly Garcia, OpportunitiesandChallenges: Women & the Law Conference Fosters
Professionalism,55 TEX.B.J. 10 (1992).
219. Hermine Tobolowsky et al., Women Share Perspectives on PracticingLaw Today, 55
TEX.B.J. 11, 12 (1992).
220. Referendum, JudicialPoll Results Told, 27 TEX. B.J. 227 (1964).
221. McKnight, Texas Community Property Law, supra note 215, at 128.
222. Id.at 12 n.74; Tobolowsky et al., supra note 219, at 12.
223. McKnight, Texas Community Property Law, supra note 215, at 128-30.
224. Joseph W. McKnight, Recodification of MatrimonialPropertyLaw, 29 TEX.B.J. 1000,
1000 (1966) [hereinafter McKnight, Recodification].
225. See id. at 1052-53 n.2.
226. Id.at 1053 n.3.
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227
Texas simply did not give women
egalitarian partnership between the spouses.
... 228 Rather, Texas
community
the
of
"an equal voice in the management
spouses' community
the
divided
that
adopted a dual management approach
229
dual management
The
source.
their
on
based
property into two separate funds
probably
obviously-and
quite
it
but
face,
approach was gender neutral on its
management
Dual
women.
most
of
intentionally-worked to the disadvantage
gave each spouse full control over his or her own earnings, regardless of
gender.23" But, this approach simply allowed most husbands to carry on exactly
3
In short, the Texas legislature granted women
as they had before the revisions.
independence from their husbands, but it did not put them on equal economic
footing with them. The outcome in the other community property states is no
different.
2. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Washington-The Equal Management Approach.--Congress sent the federal
Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA") to the states for consideration in 1972, paving
232
the way for major revisions in the remaining community property jurisdictions.
Anticipating the possible passage of the ERA and the expanding equal protection
jurisprudence, all but one (Louisiana) of the remaining community property states
revised their management laws between 1972 and 1975.233 California, Texas, and
Idaho approved the ERA in 1972.234 New Mexico and Washington followed in
1973 .235 Texas, New Mexico, and Washington also enacted amendments to their
2 36
Although
state constitutions guaranteeing equality of rights under the law.
related
and
passage
its
of
threat
the
Arizona and Nevada never adopted the ERA,
in
regimes
management
their
pressures caused Arizona and Nevada to revise

227. See McKnight, Texas Community PropertyLaw, supra note 215, at 138.
228. Huie, supra note 140, at 623.
229. See McKnight, Texas Community Property Law, supra note 215, at 138.
230. Id.
231. See Ronald G. Williams, Section 5.22 of the Texas Family Code: Control and
Management of the MaritalEstate, 27 Sw. L. J. 837, 840 (1973).
232. Roberta W. Francis, The ERA in the States, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT,
http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/states.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/AY5A-LWDF.
233. Alan Pedlar, The Implications of the New Community Property Laws for Creditors'
Remedies andBankruptcy, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 1610, 1611 n.3 (1975).
234. Linda Napikoski, When DidStatesRatify the ERA?, WOMEN'S HISTORY AT ABOUT.COM,
http://womenshistory.about.com/od/equalrightsamendment/a/When-Did-States-Ratify-ERA.htm
(last visited at Feb. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/85D5-82PD.
235. Id.
236. "Equality of rights under law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person."
N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 18; "Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex,
race, color creed, or national origin." TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 3a; "Equality of rights and
responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex." WASH. CONST. art.
31, § 1.
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1973 and 1974, respectively.23 7 Louisiana, whose revisions became effective in
1980, was, shamefully, the last to change its laws.238
These states debated a variety of approaches before adopting equal
management. Examination of these legislative and scholarly debates demonstrates
that true marital egalitarianism was not a goal of the resulting legislation. In
many respects, the resulting legislation simply maintained existing male
dominance while giving the law an appearance of constitutionality and equality.
A number of legislators and commentators favored the Texas dual
management approach,239 which was also gaining popularity internationally.24 °
However, serious questions had subsequently arisen concerning the
constitutionality of the dual management approach and states were hesitant to
adopt it.241 Although the Texas law was gender neutral on its face, "in reality the
spouse who stays in the home is going to remain economically dependent upon
the spouse who receives financial reward for working outside the home., 242 In
the end, no state explicitly adopted Texas' approach.
An alternative proposal would require the joinder of the spouses in all
transactions involving community property. 243 Despite some academic support,
the joinder approach was not seriously considered by any state. The joinder
approach would, in theory, provide for true equality between the spouses-an
outcome not desired by many legislators. 244 The joinder approach also raised
some practical problems. Requiring joinder on all community property
transactions-particularly in the case of small, ordinary transactions-would be

237. See, e.g., Arizona Appellate Decisions 1972-73, 15 ARiz.L. REv. 593 n.73 (1973).
238. See, e.g., Katherine S. Spaht, Backgroundof MatrimonialRegimes Revision, 39 LA. L.
REV. 323,324-33 (1979).
239. See id.'at 325 ("The Reporter favored equal powers of management of community
property; the members of the Advisory Committee were divided as to the direction revision should
take; and the Council appeared to favor a system 'whereby each spouse would exercise control over
her or her own earnings."').
240. The dual management approach is also referred to as a deferred community property
regime. See Jacques-Michel Grossman, Matrimonial PropertyLaw Reform: Choosing a New
Legal Regime, 8 HOLDSWORTH L. REv. 45 (1983); Gina Quijano, Matrimonial Property Law
Reform in Canada:From SeparateProperty to Community Propertywith Joint Management, 13
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 381, 393 (1975); Janet Mary Riley, Women's Rights in the Louisiana
MatrimonialRegime, 50 TUL. L. REv. 557,559(1976); Douglas H. Tess, Note, The Partnershipof
Acquests as the ProposedLegal MatrimonialProperty Regime of the Province of Quebec, 14
MCGILL L. REV. 113, 114 (1968).
241. See Robert M. Mitchell, Note, Equal Rights and Equal Protection: Who Has
Management and Control?, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 892, 910-11 (1973).
242. Quijano, supra note 240, at 393.
243. See Anne K. Bingaman, The Effects of an EqualRights Amendment on the New Mexico
System of Community Property:ProblemsofCharacterization,Management,and Control,3 N.M.
L. REv. 11, 39 (1973); Radensky, supra note 141, at 186.
244. Quijano, supra note 240, at 389.
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unduly cumbersome.2 45 Would the wife have to consent to her husband buying
a cup of coffee on his way to work? Joint management also raised serious
questions regarding who would arbitrate when the spouses were unable to agree
on a transaction.246 Some commentators outright rejected egalitarianism on
policy grounds arguing that "requiring consultation and agreement between the
spouses for all transactions presume[d] that bad faith and lack of trust are the
norm for the majority of married couples., 247 One version of joint management
proposed in California attempted to strike a balance. The proposal involved a
system of modified joint control where either spouse could engage in transactions
below a certain statutorily determined value, but joinder would be required for all
others.248 Although this approach appealed to some legislators, it was ultimately
unsuccessful.249
Another proposal-equal management-allowed either spouse, acting alone,
to manage any aspect of the community property without the consent of the other
spouse.250 A number of reformers and commentators-particularly womenendorsed the equal management approach.25 1 Equal management was
theoretically consistent with an egalitarian view of marriage:
A system of [equal] management has as its underlying premise the
assumption that each spouse is of equal competence to make decisions
affecting community property. It presumes trust and communication
between the spouses. Just as the notion basic to business partnerships is
that each partner will consult with the other before taking any action of
major importance, the [equal] management concept in the marriage arena
assumes that the spouses will similarly consult and agree.252
It is telling that no state seriously questioned the accuracy of the assumption on
which equal management is premised-that spouses will consult and agree before
making financial decisions. That assumption was patently false and it remains so
today.253 The resulting laws, therefore, would do nothing to encourage
communication and agreement between the spouses on important matters.
It is also telling that no state was willing to allow equal management to apply
to all community assets. Some commentators, for example, argued that this

245. Bingaman, supra note 243, at 43; Radensky, supra note 141, at 186.
246. Bingaman, supra note 243, at 43.
247. Id.
248. See Mitchell, supra note 241, at 913-14.
249. Radensky, supra note 141, at 186; see also John A. Adaniske, Equal Management and
Control UnderSenate Bill 569: 'To Have and To Hold' Takes on New Meaning in California, 11
SANDIEGOL. REv. 999, 1002-03 (1974).
250. See Bingaman, supra note 243, at 44; Mitchell, supra note 241, at 914-15.
251. See, e.g., Bingaman, supra note 243, at 44 (endorsing such an approach); Spaht, supra
note 238, at 325 (noting that the Reporter, Prof. Janet Mary Riley, supported this approach); Not
Tea and Crumpets, Says Women's Coalition, TIMEs-PICAYUNE, June 8, 1976, § 1, at 5.
252. Bingaman, supra note 243, at 44.
253. See supra Part IIC, III.A.
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system would be problematic where one spouse (presumably the woman) was not
adept at handling money.1 4 Others perceived some unfairness in allowing the
non-bread earning spouse (the woman) to have equal access to the earnings.255
In the end, the equal management states adopted a sort of middle ground. Some
transactions and assets were subject to equal management. Some transactions
required the joinder of both spouses. Some transactions fell within the exclusive
management rights of one spouse acting alone.
a. Equal management.-Equal management is the default rule of
management in every state except Texas. 256 Those acts and transactions that do
not require joinder and are not subject to the exclusive management by one
spouse are subject to the residual rule of equal management-a rule premised on
a largely faulty presumption of equality between the spouses. As a practical
matter, however, relatively few transactions actually fall within the scope of this
residual rule.
b. Joinder required.-The equal management states require the joinder or
consent of both spouses in a number of transactions. Joinder, in theory, furthers
egalitarianism between the spouses. The joinder requirements that exist today,
however, do not reflect any meaningful departure from the pre-revision
management regime. The joinder requirements that survived the revision do not
reflect any attempt by legislatures to increase the wife's participation in a
couple's financial decisions. Rather, the joinder requirements reflect a view that
the husband could (and would) take advantage of his otherwise powerless wife
and that the legislature ought to step in to prevent those abuses in some limited
circumstances. Retention of these joinder requirements simply reinforces the
picture of the woman as the powerless spouse in need of the law's protection.
Thesejoinder requirements also seem to contradict the assumption ofconsultation
and agreement upon which the equal management rule was premised because
they assume that joinder is needed to ensure that both spouses have a voice in
particular financial decisions. All equal management states require the joinder
of both spouses in various transactions affecting community real property 257-a
protection already won by women in most community property states decades
before the reform era.25 8 A handful of states continue to require joinder or
concurrence in the transfer or encumbrance of household furnishings, 259 a

254. Mitchell, supra note 241, at 915.
255. Id.
256. Cynthia Samuel, Restoration ofthe SeparateEstatefrom Community PropertyAfter the
Equal Management Reform: Some Thoughts on Louisiana's Reimbursement Rules, 56 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 273,274 (1993) (describing now Louisiana took a different approach than Texas).
257. See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (2015); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1102 (West 2015);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-912 (West 2015); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2347 (2015); N.M. STAT. §40-313 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (2015).
258. See supraPart II.B.
259. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(C) (West 2015); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2347 (2015)
(requiring concurrence for the "alienation, encumbrance, or lease of... furniture or furnishings
while located in the family home ..
"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230(5) (2015) (requiring
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requirement that had existed under prior law and that had been enacted to protect
otherwise powerless women from being deprived of the bare necessities of life
because of their husbands' improvidence or cruelty. 60 Retention of this particular
joinder requirement simply reinforces the picture of the woman as the powerless
spouse and seems to contradict the assumption of consultation and agreement
upon which the equal management rule was premised. The equal management
states also carried forward various restrictions on a spouse's ability to make

gratuitous transfers of community property to third parties.26 In some states the
requirement of concurrence is a matter of statute.262 In others, it is a development
of the state's jurisprudence.263
c. Exclusive management by one spouse.-A number of transactions and acts

of management are subject to the exclusive management of one spouse-an
approach that is the antithesis of egalitarianism.26" The transactions subject to
these exclusive management rules are particularly problematic because of their
importance to both the day-to-day and long term financial wellbeing of a family.

California, Louisiana, Nevada, and Washington specifically recognize a
'business exception' to management.2 65 In these states, the spouse who is the
"manager" of a sole proprietorship has the exclusive right to engage in various
acts of management affecting that business.266 This issue was the subject of
The
considerable debate that was quite clearly gendered in nature.267

(predominantely male) business community demanded the exclusive management
approach to their business dealings.268 Businessmen wanted to ensure that they

concurrence for the sale or encumbrance of "community household goods, furnishings or
appliances"); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (2015) (requiring concurrence for the sale or
encumbrance of"community household goods, furnishings, or appliances, or a community mobile
home ....).
260. See supra Part II.B.
261. See supra Part II.B.
262. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(b) (West 2015); LA. CIv. CODE art. 2349 (2015); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 123.230(3) (2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(2) (2015).
263. Estate of Hull, 885 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); Roselli v. Rio Communities
Serv. Station, Inc., 787 P.2d 428, 433 (N.M. 1990).
264. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(d) (West 2015); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2350 (2015); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 123.230(6) (2015); WASH. REV.CODE § 26.16.030(6) (2015).
265. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(d) ("[A] spouse who is operating or managing a business or an
interest in a business that is all or substantially all community personal property has the primary
management and control of the business interest."); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2350; NEV. REv. STAT. §
123.230(6); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(6).
266. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(d); LA. Crv. CODE art. 2350; NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230(6);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(6).
267. Arnold D. Kahn & Paul N. Frimmer, Management,ProbateandEstatePlanningUnder
California'sNew Community PropertyLaws, 49 CAL. STATE B. J. 516,517 (1974).
268. See Adamske, supra note 249, at 1004; Harry M. Cross, 1972 Amendments to the
Washington Community Property Law, 26 WASH. S. B. J. 9, 11 (1972) [hereinafter Cross, 1972
Amendments].
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could continue to operate without the sudden interference of their wives.269
Creditors and other third parties wanted some assurance that the husband had the
authority to continue to engage in ordinary business transactions without the
consent of his wife.27 ° Critics argued that exclusive management allowed the
manager spouse-typically the husband-to squander important community
assets without the knowledge of the other spouse.27' As a compromise, the
business exception states adopted procedural safeguards to "protect the nonacting
spouse (and thus the community) from imprudent and arbitrary decisions
'
California requires the managing
involving 'blue chip' community assets."272
spouse "give prior written notice to the other spouse of the sale, lease, exchange,
encumbrance, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the personal
property used in the operation of the business., 273 Louisiana requires the joinder
of both spouses for the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of "all or substantially
all of the assets of a community enterprise." 274 Nevada and Washington require
the consent of the nonparticipating spouse for transactions that are not in the
ordinary course of business. 275 Even with these limits in place, the business
exception statutes remained controversial in academic writing;27 6 however, little
litigation ensued in the following decades.
Today, many business owners elect to incorporate their sole proprietorships
into limited liability companies277--an option that was not available at the time
of the revision.278 Management of community interests in corporations,
partnerships, limited liability companies and other business entities typically falls
under the exclusive management of one spouse because of concepts of privity and
title.279 Once a spouse incorporates his sole proprietorship as a business entity,
the procedural safeguards of the business exception no longer apply. Statutes in
Louisiana and Washington make it clear that community personal property
registered or titled in the name of one spouse is subject to that spouse's exclusive

269. Id.
270. Id.; see also Lydia Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community Property
Problem, 30 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 153, 175 (1995).
271. Harry M. Cross, Equalityfor Spouses in Washington Community Property Law-1972
Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L. REV., 527,538 (1973) [hereinafter Cross, Equalityfor Spouses].
272. Id.
273. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(d) (West 2015).
274. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2347 (2015).
275. NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230(6) (2015), WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(6) (2015).
276. Cross, Equalityfor Spouses, supra note 271, at 528.
277. Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCS Are the New King of the Hill: An EmpiricalStudy of the
Number ofNewLLCS, Corporations,andLPSFormedinthe UnitedStates Between 2004-2007and
How LLCS Were Taxedfor Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J.CORP. & FIN. LAW 459 (2010).
278. See GLEN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, 8 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 44.01 (2014) (stating "LLCs were first introduced in the United States by
Wyoming, in 1977").
279. See generally Richard W. Effland, Arizona Community PropertyLaw: Time for Review
and Revision, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1 (1982).
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control. 2" This includes interests in business entities. Basic title concepts and
notions of privity mean that, as a practical matter, this is the case in all
community property jurisdictions. 2 ' As Professor Effland explained:
Management and control has two aspects. The first aspect involves only
the husband and wife and seeks to determine which of them has the right
to take action with respect to the property of the community. The second
aspect involves relationships between the community and third persons,
determining when a third person dealing with one of the spouses will be
protected. In a sense, the second consideration will control.282
Indeed, this second aspect grants one spouse, acting alone, the exclusive
management over virtually every item of valuable personal property that is
associated with his or her name.283
As a practical matter, if stocks are registered in the name of one spouse,
only that spouse can sell. True, the stock may be community property
despite the paper title in the name of one spouse, and theoretically the
non-titled spouse has 'equal' property to manage; but the broker will
transfer only on the signature of the registered owner.284
This "practical matter" exception to equal management is more far reaching
than registered stocks and business interests.28 It is an exception that swallows
the default rule of equal management. "When the husband receives his regular
paycheck into his own account, in what sense can it be said that the wife actually
has 'equal' management rights to the community property earnings?"286
Ironically, 87 it was Professor Pascal who coherently articulated the scope of this
inequality: "it is apparent that 'equal management' in the sense of equal and
separate power in each spouse to alienate, encumber, or lease any community
asset independently will exist as a matter of law in relatively few instances."288
In Professor Pascal's view, the only community assets that would fall under the
rule of equal management were cash disbursements, commercial bearer paper,

280. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2351, 2352 (2015); N.M. STAT. § 40-3-14 (2015).
281. Effland, supra note 279.
282. Id. at 15.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Angela M. Bradstreet, MaritalPropertyLaw in Englandand California:A Comparative
Study and Critique,4 HASTINGS INT'L& COMP. L. REv. 143, 169 (1980-1981).
286. Id.
287. Professor Pascal was outspoken in his opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment and
reform ofthe community property management laws. See, e.g., Robert A. Pascal, Louisiana's 1978
MatrimonialRegimesLegislation, 53 TUL. L. REv. 105 (1978) [hereinafter Pascal, Louisiana's1978
MatrimonialRegimes Legislation]; Robert A. Pascal, Why I Oppose the ERA, 4 S.U. L. REv. 11
(1977-78).
288. Pascal, Louisiana's 1978 MatrimonialRegimes Legislation, supra, note 287, at 112
(1978).
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and "community assets considered to be neither furnishings for a family home nor
business movables-perhaps jewelry, coin collections, clothing, sporting
equipment, pleasure boats, guns, hobby workshop tools, books, and paintings
owned as investments. 289 Indeed, this "practical matter" exception has
completely eviscerated the concept of equal management in all meaningful
respects.
IV. EXISTING MANAGEMENT LAWS PERPETUATE GENDERED
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

Equal management applies to a shockingly small percentage of a couple's
assets. Nearly every valuable asset is governed by one of the exceptions to the
default rule of equal management. It is rather inaccurate, therefore, to continue
to praise the community property system for being a "progressive" system that
places "the spouses on the same plane of equality" and treats marriage as "an
economic partnership in more than name or simple aspiration.""2 9
A. Most Non-FinancialAssets are Exempt from Equal Management
Approximately two-thirds of a couple's net worth-is attributed to nonfinancial assets.2 9' The most commonly owned non-financial assets are vehicles,
primary residence property, other residential property, and business equity.2 92
Table 3 shows the percentage of couples owning these assets and Table 4
illustrates the mean values of these assets. None of these assets is subject to equal
management. Vehicles and business equity are typically subject to the rule of
privity and fall under the exclusive management of the spouse whose name is on
the title to the asset. Both types of residential property require the j oinder of both
spouses in most major acts of management.
Table 3: Percentage of Families Holding Non-Financial Asset in 2010293
Business Equity
Other
Primary
Vehicles
Family Type
Residence

Residential
Property

Couples with

94.8%

75.6%

15.5%

17.0%

93.2%

79.7%

22.6%

19.5%

children

Couples
without
children

289. Id. at 112-13.
290. Samuel & Spaht, supra note 17, at 428.
291. Jesse Briker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Financesfrom 2007 to 2010: Evidencefrom
the Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. REs. BULL., No. 2, at 42 (June 2012), http://www.
federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/PDF/scfl 2.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/AGJ8-NBQ4.
292. Id. at 47.
293. Id. Other asset categories studied included bonds, other, and any financial asset.
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Table 4: Median Value of Asset for Families Holding Non-Financial Asset in 2010
Other
Business
Family Type
Vehicles
Primary
Residential
Equity
Residence
Property

Couples with
children
Couples without

$21,300

$190,000

$120,000

$75,000

$20,300

$180,000

$120,000

$109,000

children

B. Most FinancialAssets are Exempt From Equal Management
On average, financial assets account for more than one-third of an American
family's net worth. 294 Although financial assets account for a smaller percentage
of a couple's net worth than non-financial assets, access to financial assets is the
more important indicator of egalitarianism. 29' Access to financial assets impacts
the wellbeing of the family and children and affects spousal-relationship
quality. 296 Yet, current law discourages and in some cases prohibits the equal
participation of both spouses in decisions regarding financial assets. Today,
financial assets are almost always subject to the exclusive management of one
spouse unless the spouses affirmatively elect to take a different approach.
The most commonly owned financial assets are transaction accounts
(checking accounts, savings accounts, and money market accounts) and
retirement accounts (such as 401(k) accounts and IRAs).2"7 Table 5 shows the
percentage of couples owning these assets and Table 6 illustrates the mean values
of these assets. Financial assets-particularly transaction accounts and retirement
accounts-are the types of assets that are involved in the day-to-day financial
decisions of the spouses.298
Table 5: Percentage of Families Holding Financial Assets in 2010299
Family Type3

0

-Couples with children
Couples without children

Transaction Accounts

Retirement Accounts

94.3%
95.9%

60.1%
61.6%

294. Id. at 23.
295. See supra Part I.
296. See supra Part I.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 26 (stating that "92.5 percent of families had some type of transaction account.").
299. Id. at 28. Other asset categories studied included cash value life insurance, bonds, other,
and any financial asset.
300. Id. at 7. "Couples" includes families in which the family head was either married or
living with a partner.
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Table 6: Mean Value of Financial Asset Holdings in 2010301

Family Type
Couples3" 2
with children
Couples
without
children

All Financial
Assets

Transaction
Accounts

Retirement Accounts

$193,400

$3,800

$44,100

$209,000

$7,100

$77,400

1. TransactionAccounts-Exempt from Equal Management.-Transaction
accounts-the very place where most couples store their day-to-day spending
money-are wholly exempt from community property management laws.
Applicable laws and bank policies often operate to discourage and, in some
instances, outright prohibit, shared and informed decision-making by both
spouses in an egalitarian manner. Our increased reliance on transaction accounts
and direct deposit since the time of the community property reforms has
exacerbated this inequity. Banks and other financial institutions operate
according to a myriad of federal and state laws and internal procedures that
rarely, if ever, consider a spouse's community property rights. No law requires
a spouse to deposit community fund into a joint bank account with his or her
spouse. Spouses are free to deposit their earnings and other community funds
into any combination of joint accounts and individual accounts that they see fit
and research shows that they most often do so in a manner that is detrimental to
the wife.
Transaction accounts certainly existed at the time of the reform-but they
have become more important in the past four decades.3" 3 We have largely
transitioned from a society paid in cash, to one paid by paper check, to one paid
by direct deposit into a transaction account.3 °4 A 2014 survey indicated that
ninety-six percent of American workers receive their wages via direct deposit.3" 5
Direct deposit was in its infancy during the reform era3 °6 and, perhaps as a result,
reformers paid very little attention to the rules governing transaction accounts.

301. Id. Data is from 2010.
302. Id. "Couples" includes families in which the family hear was either married or living
with a partner.
303. See, e.g., Thomas Waterson, Those Direct-Deposit Paydays, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, (May 16, 1986), http://www.csmonitor.com/1986/0514/fwise35-f.html, archived at
http://perna.cc/F6ZL-5YVK#_blank (stating the rise in the direct deposit method of payment has
increased the use of transaction accounts).
304. Id.
305. AMERICAN PAYROLLASSOCIATION, 2014'GETTING PAID IN AMERICA SURVEY RESULTS',

availableat http://www.nationalpayrollweek.com/documents/2014GettingPaidlnAmericaSurvey
Results_FINAL_000.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HX22-L9DB#_blank.
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Despite the increased use of transaction accounts and direct deposit, no legislature
in a community property state has revised its community property management
laws to address the changes. Similarly, many employers require their employees
to participate in direct deposit, but no law requires married employees to deposit
their earnings into a transaction account jointly held with their spouses. Nor do
employers inquire into the title of the transaction account in an effort to ensure
spousal access.
A review of several account disclosures promulgated by banks in community
property states further illustrates the shocking lack of concern for community
property rights or equal management.3" 7 Indeed, none of these disclosure
statements even reference community property principles.3"' Rather, banks
operating in community property jurisdictions operate just like banks in other
states.3 °9 Banks typically allow their customers to elect whether they prefer an
individual account or a joint account.310 Individual accounts bear the name of a
single person who is deemed the account owner. 311 The individual named on the
title to the individual account is the only person who has the right to withdraw
funds from the account-regardless of his or her marital status or the community
interest in the funds.312 Federal regulations actually mandate this type of
treatment for all FDIC governed accounts.3" 3 The applicable regulations explain
that: "Community property funds deposited into one or more deposit accounts
in the name of one member of a husband-wife community shall be treated as the
individual account(s) of the named member .... A spouse whose name is not
on an individual account simply has no right to access the funds in that account
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short of a court order.315 The unnamed spouse cannot even find out basic
information about the account without the consent of the other spouse, despite
owning a portion of the funds under applicable community property laws.3" 6 A
bank may even face liability for disclosing information about one spouse's
accounts to the other spouse in the absence of a subpoena or other legal
process." 7
Joint accounts, in contrast, bear the names of two or more individuals.
Typically, all of the people named on a joint account have equal rights to the
funds in the account,3"' an approach incentivized by the federal regulations.3" 9 A
couple could, of course, elect to deposit all of their funds into a single joint
account and thereby adopt an egalitarian approach to money management. As
Part I explains, however, couples rarely (if ever) take this approach. Thus, a
couple's transaction account arrangement is more likely to perpetuate an unequal
and gendered approach to money management, notwithstanding default state
community property laws to the contrary.
2. Retirement Accounts-Exempt from Equal Management.-Retirement
benefits earned during marriage are considered community property in every
community property state.32° The law protects the rights of a divorced spouse to
his or her share of retirement assets held in the name of the other spouse.32 1 Yet,
the law specifically prohibits a spouse from participating in management of a
retirement account during an in-tact marriage. Retirement accounts are subject
to the exclusive management of the employee-spouse or the spouse whose name
is on the title to the account. Not only does this arrangement discourage spouses
from managing retirement assets in an egalitarian manner; it will typically favor
the male spouse because of persisting lifetime gender pay disparities.
Retirement assets received little attention during the reform era probably
because most voluntary employee retirement plans at the time were defined
benefit plans.322 These plans typically pay the retired employee a lifetime fixed
annuity that is determined by reference to years of employment and/or salary.323
Management is not a particularly meaningful attribute of employee participation
in defined benefit plans because these plans require little, if any, decision making
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on the part of the employee.324

In the past forty years, however, defined contribution plans have begun to
replace defined benefit plans.325 The growing popularity of defined contribution
plans has "shift[ed] the responsibility for managing retirement assets from the
professional money managers who oversee defined benefit plan investments to
individual participants in defined contribution plans. 3 26 As a result, management
is an important attribute of ownership of most defined contribution plans.3 27 The
plan participant must decide what percentage of his current earnings he will
invest in the plan each year. 328 The plan participant must also decide how to
invest his savings and manage those investments throughout the course of saving
for retirement. 29 Yet, these plans have been specifically designed to thwart the
equal participation by both spouses in those very acts of management.
Due to a combination of state and federal regulations and privity of contract
principles, the plan participant has the exclusive right to manage his defined
contribution plan-regardless of his marital status. The decision whether to
participate in the plan, what percentage of current earnings to invest in the plan,
and how to allocate those investments rests squarely with the individual
participating in the plan.330 Unlike transaction accounts, retirement plans have no
joint ownership or title option that would allow even allow equal management.33'
The law, therefore, essentially prohibits egalitarian participation by both spouses
in the management of retirement assets-an obviously unsound policy.
CONCLUSION

The movement to "reform" the management of marital property has done
little to alter the fundamental inequality that prompted reform in the first place.
Legislative changes to management rules reflected the presumption that women
would obtain greater control over their money as they began to earn more. But
that presumption has proven untrue. While the earnings gap between men and
women has narrowed, the power gap with respect to the management of funds has
not.
Research consistently demonstrates three things:
(1) Egalitarian management of a couple's resources has a positive impact on
their relationship, their wellbeing, their family, and society as a whole;
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(2) Gendered and unequal management of a couple's resources has a
negative impact on their relationship, their wellbeing, their family, and
society as a whole; and
(3) Given the option, couples tend to elect harmful gendered and unequal
management of their resources.
Legislation has not only failed to address the problems revealed by this research,
in many instances the inequality has been mandated by legislation. Community
property laws have failed to deliver on their promise of equality and partnership
and can no longer be called progressive or beneficial to women. Today, they are
quite the opposite. Because the problem of gender inequity remains embedded
in the bedrooms and bank accounts of American families decades after reforms,
the need for a new era of reform is upon us.

